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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 16425

\•JILLINI EARL HARRISON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by complaint and information
with arranging for the distribution for value of a controlled
substance, marijuana, in violation of Utah Code Ann.,
§

58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv),

(1953) as amended.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried without a jury before the
Honorable Allan B. Sorenson on March 21, 1979, and was
found guilty as charged.

Following a pre-sentence report,

he was sentenced to a term not to exceed five years in the
Ctah State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent urges the Court to affirm the

convicti~

and sentence of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At 7:30 p.m.

on November 26, 1978, a police

informant named Jim Schnorrenberg (hereinafter "Jim"), met
with officers at the Vernal City Police station (T. 12, 37).
The police skin-searched Jim.

They also examined his car

by looking under the dash and front seat and under
which was.notsecured down (T. 13, 27, 32, 37).
then gave Jim $25.00.

everythin~

The police

They noted the serial numbers of the

money and had him sign an agreement which indicated that he
would only use the money for the purchase of controlled
substances in connection with police activities (T. 13).
The police then followed Jim as he drove his own
car to the house of

a~pellant

(T. 14, 28, 38).

He entered

appellant's home and asked appellant and appellant's girlfriend if he could buy cocaine or "bags"

(T. 39, 66, 81).

Appellant indicated that he didn't have any, but that he
a girl named "Suzy" who might be able to provide some
marijuana (T. 39, 67, 81).

Jim went back to the police

station and was researched (T. 15).
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At 8:45 p.m.

the

same evening, Jim returned

to appellant's house, again followed and observed by police
officers (T. 15, 29, 39).

Appellant and Jim entered the

latter's car and drove to an apartment where Suzy was
supposed to be staying (T. 15, 29, 40, 68, 82).

Although

it is unclear, appellant's girlfriend may also have accompanied
them (T. 68, 82, 83).

The group then obtained gasoline and

proceeded to a J.B. 's restaurant where they had been told
Suzy would be found

(T. 16, 40, 69, 83).

Jim and appellant entered the restaurant where
they found Suzy with her friend Nick.

Appellant introduced

Jim to Suzy and took a seat in her booth across the table.
Jim sat in the booth behind (T. 41, 84-85).

Appellant told

Suzy that Jim wished to buy some marijuana and asked Nick
if he would move so Jim could sit next to Suzy to see the
product (T. 41, 42).

Jim moved and was shown marijuana.

He purchased three bags for $25.00

(T. 42).

Jim and appellant returned to appellant's house
where some marijuana was shared with or given to appellant
and the three bags of marijuana were combined into one
larger bag (T. 43, 72 and 87).

Jim testified that

appellant asked if he would give him a "joint" or two for
setting up the buy (T. 43).
both indicated that

Ji~

Appellant and his girlfriend

and aopellant shared a "joint" at

Jim's suagestion (T. 72, 87).
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Jim returned to the Vernal Police Department
where he gave them a bag of marijuana.
person were again searched (T. 17, 44).

His car and
The bag of

marijuana taken from Jim was introduced at trial and
was stipulated to be marijuana (T. 60), although appellant
objected to its introduction on the basis that the searches
of the car were not thorough enough to guarantee that the
marijuana was the same substance purchased from Suzy (T. 61).
The court found appellant guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced him to a term of not more than five
years in the Utah State Prison (R. 17)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
UTAH CODE ANN., § 58-37-8 (1) (a)
(iv), (1953), AS AMENDED IS NOT
VAGUE OR UNCLEAR.
Utah Code Ann., § 58-37-8 (1953), as amended,
provides:
(1) (a)
Except as authorized by
this act, it shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly and intentionally:
(iv) To agree, consent, offer, or arrange
to distribute or dispense a controlled
substance for value or to negotiate to
have a controlled substance distributed
or dispensed for value
The crime charged in the instant matter succinctly requires
that the actor must knowingly or intentionally arrange to
have a controlled substance distributed for value.

The
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"buy'', that is, introducing a potential customer to a dealer
of illicit substances, constitutes knowingly or intentionally
arranging for the distribution for value of the illicit
substance.

If such is clearly the case, then appellant

has no standing to challenge the statute as vague even
if the statute might be unclear in its application to
other conduct.
P.2d 936

This Court noted in State v. Phillips, 540

(Utah, 1975):
Also important to be considered .
is the principle that no one should be
entitled to challenge a statute and have
it declared void because it may unjustly
affect someone else, but could properly
do so only if his own rights are adversely
affected.

Id. at 940.

See also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733. 756

In Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805

(1974).

(Utah, 1974),

this Court enunciated several more general rules applicable
to a determination of the constitutionality of statutes:
Because the duty rests upon the courts
to determine the scope of the government,
they have a special resporisibility to
exercise a high degree of caution and
restraint to keep themselves within
the limitations of the judicial power
in order not to infringe upon the
prerogatives of the executive or the
legislative branches.
In harmony with
that policy it is the well-established
rule that legislative enactments are
endowed with a strong presumption of
validity; and that they would not be
declared unconstitutional if there is
any reasonable basis upon which they can
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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be found to come within the
constitutional framework; and that
a statute will not be stricken down as
being unconstitutional unless it appears
to be so beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 806-807.

See also Utah Code Ann., § 68-3-2

(1953,

as amended).
This Court has also stated:
Concerning the question of
uncertainty or vagueness of
statutes, the authorities seem to be
in accord that the test a statute must
meet to be valid is:
It must be sufficiently definite (a) to inform persons
of ordinary intelligence, who would be
law abiding, what their conduct must be
to conform to its requirements; (b)
to
advise a defendant accused of violating
it just what constitutes the offense with
which he is charged, and {c) to be
susceptible of uniform interpretation and
application by those charged with responsibility of applying and enforcing it.
State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561, 564
also Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035, 1037

(1952)

See

(Utah, 197:

Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (l92G
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 574, 572-573 (1974), and Jellum v.
Cupp, 475 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir., 1973).
In the instant matter, most of the terms in the
statute under which 3ppellant was charged are specifically
defined.

Stated again, appellant was charged with having

knowingly or intentionally arranging for the distribution
for value of a controlled substance (see Utah Code Ann.,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Section 58-37-8 (a) (a) (iv), supra).

"Knowingly and

intentionally" are defined in Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-2-103

(1953), as amended, as:
. when it is his (the actor's)
conscious objective or desire to engage
in the conduct or cause the result
(intentionally)
or,
. when he is aware this his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause
the result,
(knowingly .
"Distribution for value" is defined in Utah Code Ann.,
Section 53-37-2(8),

(1953), as amended, as:

to deliver a controlled
substance in exchange for compensation, consideration, or item
of value, or promise therefor .
Finally, "controlled substance" is defined in Utah Code
Ann.,

§

58-37-2 (5)

(1953), as amended:

The words "controlled substance"
mean a drug, substance, or immediate
precursor in schedules I, II, III, IV,
or v of section 58-37-4.
The words do
not include distilled spirits, wine, or
malt beverages, as those terms are
defined or used in Title 32, tobacco or
food.
The only term within the crime charged in the
instant matter which is not specifically defined within the
Utah Code is the word "arrange."
argue otherwise,

Although appellant would

(Appellant's Brief, pp. 3-4), the word

"arrange" is commonly used and well understood.

An arrangement

is defined in Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd Ed.
Sponsored by the S.J.
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(3) An agreement or settlement
of details made in anticipation; as,
arrangements for receiving company.
Stated differently, to arrangeisto prepare or provide for
the occurance of some expected event.

As applied to this

statute, an actor must knowingly and intentionally arrange
for a sale to take place.

In other words, the actor must

perform an act or series of acts in anticipation of or in
preparation for a sale of controlled substances which he
either wants to take place or is reasonably certain will
take place.
The Packard test is clearly satisfied by this
statute.

(State v. Packard, supra).

A person wishing to

abide by the law is put on notice that he must have
nothing to do with a sale of illicit substances, whether for
profit or not.

A person charged with the crime knows that

~

is charged with helping to set up an illegal sale of controlled substances.

Finally, the statute is "susceptible

of uniform interpretation and application by t;10se charged
with responsibility of applying and enforcing it."
Packard, supra).

(State

Just as selling a crowbar in a hardware

store might aid a burglar in his work but not constitute
the crime of aiding and abetting in

b~~glary,

so an action

which made possible an illegal drug purchase but which was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1·

not done knowingly or intentionally for that purpose does
not fit within the proscription of the statute.

Nevertheless,

those who purposefully act to assist in or "arrange" for the
sale of drugs are clearly doing so in violation of the law.
courts and law enforcement officials are not left to guess
at the meaning of the statute, its meaning is clear.

It

follows that the statute is not void for vagueness and should
be upheld.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION
OF THE TRIER OF FACT THAT APPELLANT
KNE\~ OR INTENDED THAT THERE \~OULD BE
A DISTRIBUTION FOR VALUE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE AS A RESULT OF HIS
ACTIONS.
Appellant argues that the state failed to establish
the proof necessary for a conviction under the crime charged
in that it failed to either,

(1) show that appellant received

value or consideration for his part in the transaction, or,
(2)

show that appellant knew or intended that a distribution

for value would take place between the police informant and
Suzy (Appellant's Brief, Point II at pp. 6-8).
Initially, it must be noted that there was evidence
to the effect that appellant asked for and received some of
the marijuana purchased for his part in setting up the
deal

(T.

~3).

Although this testimony was contradicted

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by both appellant and his girlfriend (T. 72, 87), the
credibility of the various witnesses and determination of
controverted issues is the province of the trier of fact.
See State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah, 1977); State v.
Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah, 1976); and State v.

\~ilson,

565

P.2d 66 (Utah, 1977).
Nevertheless, even if it is assumed that appellant
received no compensation for his part, the elements of the
crime charged do not require proof that the defendant
received value, only that a distribution for value took
place and that the defendant intended or was reasonably
certain that a distribution for value would take place as
a result of his actions (see Utah Code Ann., § 58-37-8, supra
~~ether

or not the State of Utah is or should be concerned

with one who sets up a sale of drugs but receives no compensation is a judgment already made by the legislature.
It would be improper for this Court to re-examine such a
policy decision.

See Greaves v. State, supra.

Finally, appellant's claim that he did not

kno~

or intend that a distribution for value would take place
as a result of his actions is not supported by the

:idence.

Appellant told the seller, Suzy, that the informanL wanted
to "buy" some of the product (T. 41).

The informant

testified that the appellant told him that he had no cocaino
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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but that "he had a girl in from Salt Lake, a girlfriend,
Suzy; that she might could fix me up if she hadn't sold
out."

(T.

52).

He also asked Nick to move so the

informant could bargain with Suzy (T. 42).

All of this,

plus the generally known fact that marijuana is not given
away but is usually sold, make the inference that
appellant knew or intended that a sale of marijuana for
value would result from his actions that night reasonable
and proper.
POINT III.
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE ADMISSION
OF THE ~RIJUANA ALLEGEDLY PURCHASED
AS A RESULT OF APPELLANT'S ARRANGEMEN~S.
Admissibility of a physical object of evidence is
a discretionary matter for the trial court.

The ruling of

the trial court in such a matter should not be overturned
unless there is an abuse of discretion shown.
t1adsen, 28 Utah 2d 108, 498 P.2d 670, 672

See State v.

(1972).

There

'Nas no abuse of discretion shown in the instant matter.
bag of marijuana

co~plained

The

of was identified by the police

informant as the bag he put the marijuana into on the night
in question (T. 43-44).

Appellant's counsel objected to the

admission of the bag, claiming that there was a lack of
evidence supporting an inference that the bag was the same
bag into which the informant had put the marijuana purchased
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from Suzy.

Although he denied that his objection went to

the weight to be given the evidence rather than to its
admissibility, he was unable to cite, then or now, any rule
of law to justify his position (T. 61, Appellant's Brief,
pp. 8-9).
The marijuana was certainly relevant evidence within
the scope of Rule 1 of the Rules of Evidence:
(1)
"Evidence," as used in these
rules, includes the means, oral,
documentary, or physical, used as proof
on issues of fact.
( 2)
"Relevant evidence" means
evidence having any tendency in reason
to prove or disprove the existence of any
material fact.
Whether or not the evidence was what it was claimed to be is
a matter for the trier of fact to determine, and does not
pertain to the admissibility in this instance.
Furthermore, even if it is assumed that the
evidence was improperly admitted, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Evidence provides that the erroneous admission of evidence
is not grounds for reversal unless the evidence can be said
to have had a substantial influence upon the verdict.

In

this matter, there was substantial evidence beyond the
marijuana itself which indicated that a sale of marijuana
took place.

Appellant's girlfriend testified that the

bag looked like the one the informant put the marijuana into
(T. 71).

Although appellant denies having been aware at
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the time that a sale of marijuana was taking place, the
evidence that a sale did take place was uncontradicted.
Moreover, the evidence clearly indicated that appellant
intended that a sale would take place (see Point II, supra).
Even if the marijuana itself had not been introduced, there
was sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to find
that appellant intentionally arranged for the sale of a
controlled substance.

Consequently, there was no

prejudicial error in the trial court's admission of the
bag of marijuana as evidence.
CONCLUSION
The crime of arranging for the distribution of
a controlled substance for value is clear and well defined.
Those seeking to conform their actions to the law are
clearly advised of what conduct is prohibited.
charged are

~pprised

Those

of what is claimed as guilty conduct.

Finally, those entrusted with enforcing the law are given
clear standards to guide their actions.

The law is not overly

vague and should be upheld as a constitutional act of the
legislature.
Although the evidence was contradicted by
appellant, there was testimony to the effect that appellant
sought and received some of the marijuana purchased in
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return for setting up the sale.

Moreover, it is clear

that appellant knew or intended that a sale of marijuana
would take place as a result of his action in introducing
the police informant to Suzy.
Finally, there was no error in the admission of
the marijuana as evidence.

Appellant's objections go to

the weight to be accorded the evidence, not its

admissibili~.~

The marijuana was relevant evidence within the scope of
the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Respondent urges this Court to affirm the
and sentence of the lower

cour~

in this

convicti~

mat~er.

Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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